The 2013 terrorist attack: Independent investigation of the alleged terrorist attack by Russian special services in Boston.
Preface
This investigation is prompted by the necessity to establish the truth, distorted under conditions of fear, silence, and disinformation. It is conducted not for private interests or political purposes, but in the name of the victims of the terrorist attack in Boston on April 15, 2013, those who suffered from terrorism, in the name of the Chechen people who survived genocide, and also for the sake of the rule of law and international legality. We strive for truth free from propaganda and censorship, and we do not recognize such crimes as either permissible or inevitable.
The report of Human Rights Center Ichkeria is based on an independent analysis of facts, evidence, and verified sources. As a human rights defender, who participated as a lawyer in the case of the attempted terrorist attack on the Sapsan train in 2011, I question the official version rooted in public opinion and institutions. We rely on facts, not emotions, in order to restore trust in justice, ensure the independence of the investigation, and establish the true perpetrators of the tragedy, preventing its repetition. The purpose of this report is truth, not revenge.
On April 15, 2013, two explosions at the finish line of the Boston Marathon claimed the lives of three people — eight-year-old Martin Richard, student Lingzi Lu, and Krystle Campbell. More than 280 people were injured, of whom 17 lost limbs. Responsibility for the terrorist attack was placed on the brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Chechens by origin. The FBI promptly presented the incident as an attack by “lone wolves,” allegedly inspired by jihadist ideology, including materials of “Al-Qaeda” and the website “Kavkaz-Center,” falsely positioning itself as pro-Chechen. In practice, “Kavkaz-Center” has long acted as a tool aimed at the destruction of the Chechen resistance and the implementation of the FSB’s plan of the “final solution of the Chechen question.” Controlled by Russian and possibly other special services, this resource is used as a channel of provocations, recruitment, and managed terror under the Islamic flag.
The Boston terrorist attack became not only a tragic event, but also a catalyst for reconsidering approaches to security, the exchange of intelligence information, and the role of the media in covering emergencies.
In my view, the Boston terrorist attack was not an act of religious extremism, but an act of state terrorism, carried out by Russian special services — in the form of a false flag operation, aimed at destabilization and undermining the national security and sovereignty of the United States.
Its possible goals:
1. To disrupt U.S. preparation for a military operation against the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria (2013), to draw Washington into counterterrorist cooperation with Russia — on the Kremlin’s terms;
2. To inflict the maximum blow on the United States: to kill citizens, to undermine trust in the FBI and CIA, to shake internal security;
3. To discredit the struggle of the Chechen resistance against the occupation of their country by creating a lasting association between Chechens and terror, in order to cut off the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria from Western support for the subsequent “final solution of the Chechen question” by hybrid methods;
4. To carry out personal revenge against former CIA officer Graham Fuller — ex-relative of the Tsarnaevs through marriage, as well as to discredit Ruslan Tsarni.
Neither the U.S. nor the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria were initiators or beneficiaries of these events. Both sides became their victims. Everything indicates the implementation of a multi-stage operation — with long-term consequences for international security and the global balance of power.
The situation with the Tsarnaev family
Of great importance in the case is the widely cited FSB recording of a conversation between Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his mother, Zubeidat. Formally, it appears in notifications sent to the FBI, and later to the CIA back in 2011, however in fact it was transferred only in April 2013 — already after the terrorist attack. Everything indicates that the recording itself was not made in 2011, but later — probably in 2012, during the period when Tamerlan and his mother were already in Dagestan. In 2011, both were in the U.S., and the FSB did not have the technical capability to intercept such a conversation without exposure before American special services. Already after the tragedy, seeking to remove suspicion from itself, the FSB retrospectively implants a recording created later, presenting it as if it were an old one.
Based on the analysis of investigative materials conducted by the American side, it can be assumed: recruitment and the initial stage of preparation for the attack on U.S. territory began soon after a certain Mikhail Allakhverdov appeared in the circle of Tamerlan Tsarnaev, according to other sources from the network of Mikhail Panayotov. According to CNN, “Misha” is a man, presumably of Azerbaijani or Armenian origin, who converted to Islam and had significant influence on Tamerlan in 2009. According to Tamerlan’s mother, Zubeidat Tsarnaeva, he presented himself as a “true Muslim,” regularly visited their home, and inspired the family toward increasingly radical religious practice. The Tsarnaevs’ uncle, Ruslan Tsarni, stated that it was precisely “Misha” who “took possession of Tamerlan’s mind,” after which he abandoned boxing and music. In 2013, the FBI interrogated Allakhverdov, who admitted knowing Tsarnaev, but categorically denied involvement in his radicalization or the terrorist attack. After interrogation, he was not charged, and soon disappeared from public view. No confirmed data exists of his connection to the FSB or GRU, however his sudden disappearance and the absence of any information fuel justified suspicions. A similar technique was used by the FSB in the so-called “Sapsan case.” In that case, I was a lawyer for one of the accused.
The fact is that this operation was directed by Nikolai Patrushev, since it was precisely he who then reported on TV to the then-president of Russia Dmitry Medvedev about the “successfully prevented terrorist attack.” In the conditions of Russian realities, this indicates that it is Patrushev himself who supervises the Chechen direction connected with discrediting Chechens, and accordingly organizes terrorist acts. Former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko and other researchers have thoroughly proven that in 1999 it was precisely Patrushev who stood behind the series of apartment building explosions in Russian cities. When attempting to blow up the fifth building in Ryazan, FSB officers were detained. Then Patrushev publicly declared that it was “an exercise,” and in the bags found in the basement there was allegedly not hexogen, but sugar. This episode and many other pieces of evidence unambiguously indicated that the FSB and personally Patrushev were behind the explosions. The explosions were used against Chechens, and also became the pretext for the repeated large-scale military invasion of Russia on July 17, 1999, into the territory of the sovereign Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
The attempted explosion of the Sapsan train in Russia in 2011 — scenically very close to the Boston terrorist attack and preceding it by only two years — makes it possible to assert: this is not about isolated episodes, but about the manifestation of systematic work of Russian special services to form and launch “instruments” of terror of the “Tsarnaevs” type.
Looking ahead, I note: within Chechen society for many years a purposeful effort was conducted by Russian agents of influence to form the image of the U.S. — and personally Bill Clinton — as enemies of the Chechen people, allegedly involved in the killing of the first president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and leader of the Chechen people, Dzhokhar Dudayev. In my previous investigation of May 20 of this year, I studied this case in detail, and it was noted that the U.S. not only was not involved, but objectively could not have known about the assassination attempt being prepared that day. Nevertheless, the scale of Russian propaganda and the depth of the implanted narrative are such that for many Chechens no alternative version remained at all, and the Americans did not comment on it or provide explanations, since for them these details were insignificant. All this fits into the logical structure of a multi-level, long-term operation.
This report offers a chronology of the possible recruitment of Tamerlan by Russia under a false flag, parallels with the case of the attempted explosion of the “Sapsan” train, as well as elements of the reproduction of a similar scenario that has already begun at present in Germany — where the role of the conditional “Tsarnaevs” has been assigned to some of my relatives, and to me — the role of Ruslan Tsarni. In addition, a parallel will be drawn with the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 as an example of how British special services found themselves on the brink of international humiliation as a result of a nuclear terrorist attack in the center of London. Only a true miracle allowed them to virtuously solve this case, expose the FSB, and prevent the repetition of similar scenarios using polonium.
The report will also present legal argumentation, logical analysis of events, an examination of Russia’s geopolitical interests, and the damage inflicted on the United States and the Chechen people.
II. Chronology of events and recruitment
From 1995–1999 Ruslan Tsarni, who supported the first president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Dzhokhar Dudayev, was married to the daughter of Graham Fuller, a high-ranking CIA officer in 1960–1988. Fuller’s connection with Tsarni, the uncle of Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, made him a target for compromise. The FSB registered this connection as an instrument for a reputational strike, using Tsarni’s nephews to carry out a terrorist attack.
Zubeidat Tsarnaeva, the mother of Tamerlan and Dzhokhar, an ethnic Avar from the Russian republic of Dagestan, in the 2000s began to show signs of radicalization, becoming fascinated by the ideas of radical Islam under the influence of her circle and probably relatives in Dagestan, including, according to media reports, a certain Mikhail (“Misha”), who had converted to Islam. Her family ties in Dagestan could have been used as a channel of influence by Russian special services. Such a practice of the KGB/FSB — recruitment through the mother — is well known, especially in relation to the peoples of the North Caucasus, where deep respect for the figure of the mother and her influence on the worldview of sons is traditionally preserved. About the methods of such so-called “influence” the American expert Egon Chalikyan explains very convincingly and in detail (https://youtu.be/pQcEFcCZgYw?si=IPOvRRZNKRxVA0ZZ). Using the example of school shootings, he demonstrates the techniques by which Russian special services are able to influence a person and achieve from him the actions they need.
During that period Dagestan turned into a testing ground for the development of new terrorist technologies of the Kremlin and into the largest base for the training of Islamist recruiters and ideologues acting under the control of the FSB and GRU. Subsequently, many of them were almost openly directed through the territory of Turkey into Syria to participate as part of various Islamist armed formations.
According to information from the network, in 2011 the father of the Tsarnaev brothers, Anzor Tsarnaev, divorced Zubeidat, possibly because of her radicalization and conflicts caused by FBI attention to her and to Tamerlan. Afterward Anzor flew to Russia. In March and October 2011 the FSB notified the FBI, and later the CIA, of Tamerlan’s radicalization, referring to an intercepted conversation with Zubeidat in which jihad and his possible intention to join the “holy war” were discussed. The warnings were deliberately vague, without providing an audio recording. After communicating with Tamerlan, during which nothing dangerous was discovered, the FBI closed the case, but nevertheless Tamerlan and his mother were entered into special databases. And they could not have found anything, since by that time Tamerlan had not yet been psychologically processed by the FSB and had not turned into an American-hating terrorist — the real “trigger mechanism” was launched in Dagestan, when in January 2012 he returned to Dagestan to exchange his Russian passport.
Judging by the name of Tamerlan’s younger brother — Dzhokhar (a rare and ancient Chechen name), one can conclude that the Tsarnaev family supported the Democratic Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and its president Dzhokhar Dudayev. Accordingly, this family became a target for Russian special services, about which I have already written earlier. In my view, after Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s family was taken under development, the method of substitution of focus was applied against them: dissatisfaction and resistance against Russia were redirected onto the United States. Russia has long been implanting into Chechen society the narrative that Chechens are allegedly fighting not against Russia, but against the entire non-Muslim world. In this way the FSB hides behind the backs of the international community, above all the United States. Further I will show how this happens, but now it is important to note that it was precisely in this way that Russia managed to present in the eyes of the world community the national liberation struggle of the Chechen people for the de-occupation of their country as a struggle for the creation of a certain “Islamic state.”
In my view the FSB used these warnings to check the databases of the FBI and CIA to determine whether Tsarnaev was their agent, before luring Tamerlan to Russia, as well as to create a pretext for accusations of incompetence of American special services after the terrorist attack and even for indirect complicity in the future terrorist attack. The absence of the recording in the case in 2011 indicates that it could have been created later, for example, in 2012, and presented as an earlier one.
Conflicts in the family due to the FBI’s attention probably pushed Anzor to divorce. Possibly he was persuaded to return to Makhachkala by the end of 2011, promising him safety and work. That he found in Russia a highly paid job in his specialty was told by Zubeidat in one of her interviews already being in Russia. If the FSB intended to sacrifice his sons, then in America within reach of American investigators he was definitely not needed.
In January 2012 Tamerlan arrived to his father in Makhachkala. By that time the resistance in Dagestan was already under the full control of the FSB through so-called pseudo-jamaats. It is known that the mayor of Makhachkala and bloody agent of the FSB Said Amirov had his own pseudo-Islamic groups, and probably it was into one of them that Tamerlan fell.
At bases controlled by the FSB, Tamerlan was probably trained in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices. Psychological processing, including messages about the killings of comrades in Dagestan, convinced him of the necessity of a suicidal action, redirecting his anti-Russian sentiments toward the United States. In June 2012 Zubeidat left the United States and joined Anzor in Makhachkala.
IMPORTANT: In the case of the Tsarnaev brothers, the informational influence of the resource “Kavkaz-Center,” which is under the control of the FSB, can be traced. Analysis of the site’s publications before and after the Boston terrorist attack makes it possible to assume that they could have had a psychological impact on Tamerlan Tsarnaev.
The fact is that in 1999, when the FSB was blowing up apartment buildings in order to blame it on the Chechens, Russia carried out a large-scale special operation in Dagestan. In particular, two settlements — Chaban-Makhi and Karamakhi — with the permission of Russian authorities and special services began to be called “independent sharia territories.”
These were just small mountain Dagestani villages. For several years (1996–1999) in these villages Russia in fact allowed the existence of a sharia form of governance. The then Minister of Internal Affairs Sergei Stepashin approved of this experiment, and the president of Russia Boris Yeltsin called it an expression of freedom of religion.
Russia invaded the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria on July 17, 1999, and did not abandon the idea of setting two neighboring peoples against each other, using these mountain villages. For this purpose Moscow decided to liquidate these Dagestani “sharia villages,” and pulling in troops there began methodically destroying the population. Then representatives of these districts of Dagestan appealed for help to the Chechens. Shamil Basaev, who at that moment did not occupy any state posts, gathered volunteers and on August 6, 1999, set out on a rescue operation to break through a corridor and bring women and children into the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, and at the same time to strike the aggressor from the rear.
However, the formal owner of “Kavkaz-Center,” Movladi Udugov, who after the death of Dzhokhar Dudayev, in my opinion and in the opinion of Chechen society, acted against the interests of the Chechen people, stated on video that “we will be the first to attack the kafirs,” that is, Russia. This completely contradicted the real objective of the operation. Also, Akhmed Zakayev, then Minister of Culture in the government of Maskhadov, created within his ministry a headquarters which positioned what was happening as a “jihad against Russia.”
Thus, on the one hand, Patrushev was organizing the bombings of apartment buildings in Russia, and on the other — such figures as Udugov and Zakayev were presenting the Chechens as aggressors. Only the exposure of the terrorist attack in Ryazan, when FSB officers were detained, disrupted this plan and did not allow a complete blaming of the Chechens, but it did not stop the war machine that had been set in motion.
Since then, “Kavkaz-Center” systematically carried out anti-Chechen activities. This resource is anti-Chechen, aside from the external mask of a “pro-Chechen” project. Thus, already after the terrorist attack in Boston it was precisely “Kavkaz-Center” that was spinning the Syrian theme, facilitating the involvement of Chechens in the civil war in Syria, which inflicted colossal damage on our people. Here a direct connection can be traced between the Russian special services and “Kavkaz-Center,” acting with the aim of weakening the Caucasian resistance and transferring it into Syria.
In this attempt to discredit the Chechen resistance they also tried to involve the former president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Doku Umarov. Akhmed Zakayev then declared that Umarov allegedly was also planning to move to Syria, but this did not happen.
For example, the 2011 article “Did America Pay an Annual Tax to the Caliphate?” (https://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/05/31/82044/platila-li-amerika-ezhegodnyj-nalog-khalifatu.shtml) may be part of this influence. A search on the site using the keywords “Boston” and “Tsarnaev” in combination with analysis of Tamerlan’s route and actions creates a persistent impression that “Kavkaz-Center” could have been the informational accompaniment of his radicalization.
It is also noteworthy that on April 21, 2012, after the supposed death of a close comrade of Tamerlan in Dagestan, when he was likely in a state of shock, an article appeared on the site baselessly accusing the United States of involvement in the death of Dzhokhar Dudayev (16 years since the Shahada of Dzhokhar Dudayev)
It should also be noted that the terrorist attack in Boston occurred in April, likely with the aim of strengthening the suspicion against the Chechens as revenge for Dudayev. In my analysis I substantiated that the United States had no relation to this event (https://www.hrcichkeria.com/%d1%83%d0%b1%d0%b8%d0%b9%d1%81%d1%82%d0%b2%d0%be-%d0%b4%d0%b6%d0%be%d1%85%d0%b0%d1%80%d0%b0-%d0%b4%d1%83%d0%b4%d0%b0%d0%b5%d0%b2%d0%b0-%d1%81%d0%be%d0%b2%d0%bf%d0%b0%d0%b4%d0%b5%d0%bd%d0%b8%d0%b5/). There are very many such coincidences on this site.
It is also important to note the informational accompaniment that followed after the terrorist act. Despite the fact that the terrorist attack was not large-scale and the number of dead was relatively small, each such event is horrific, and I express my sincere condolences to the relatives and loved ones of the dead, the wounded, as well as to the American nation.
At the same time, it should be emphasized that even larger terrorist attacks on the territory of the United States were not accompanied by such a kind of informational resonance and elevation to the level of a national tragedy, which, in my opinion, looks very suspicious and is striking. This leads to the thought that such a thing was organized by someone’s skillful informational propagandist hand. And given that at that time on the territory of the United States Russian propagandists were operating absolutely freely, this is easily explained.
It should also be noted that immediately after the death of Dzhokhar Dudayev began the insertions that the United States was allegedly involved in his killing and that the Americans helped the Russians. However, no evidence was presented for this, except for the fact that on the day of the death of Dzhokhar Dudayev, U.S. President Bill Clinton was in Moscow. Such a method of killing Chechen military and political leaders coinciding with visits of Western politicians to Moscow was used by Russia repeatedly. Likely, this was done for pressure on the politicians themselves, a demonstration of force, as well as their indirect discrediting, by a hint at their involvement in crimes against the Chechen people.
We see an analogous scenario, for example, during the visit of Marine Le Pen to Moscow: then on March 24, 2017 in the Naursky district of Ichkeria an attack on the occupational unit of the “Rosgvardiya” was staged. A simulated battle was arranged, it was announced about the “killing of six Russian soldiers,” and the bodies of six young Chechens previously kidnapped by Russian security structures were thrown into the place of the supposed attack.
The same behavior we observe today. On the night of July 4, 2025, immediately after the telephone conversation of Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, Russia carried out one of the largest strikes of the entire war: according to sources, 550 missiles and drones were used, the main target of the attack was Kyiv. The strike followed a few hours after negotiations, at which, according to reports, a cessation of hostilities was being discussed. A similar situation occurred after the meeting of Putin and Trump in Alaska on August 21, 2025: shortly after it Russia struck the American factory on the territory of Ukraine. These are typical methods of Russia’s terrorist activity.
It was precisely in that period that a publication appeared on Kavkaz-Center claiming that the United States supposedly “paid tribute to the caliphate.” In Islamist interpretation, non-Muslims — dhimmis (ahl al-dhimma), paying the jizya, are under the protection of the Islamic state: their life, property, and freedom of religion are guaranteed. In the case of refusal to pay or violation of the conditions of the agreement, protection is annulled, and they are transferred into the category of “ahl al-harb” — people of war, against whom military actions are permitted. Radicals reduce this to a simplified formula: “pay — under protection, do not pay — enemies.” Similar rhetoric is often used by Iranian religious propagandists regarding Israel.
And sixteen years after the killing of Dzhokhar Dudayev, a publication appeared on “Kavkaz-Center” asserting that it was precisely the Americans who were involved in his death. No evidence was presented in the article. Moreover, the published photograph was clearly a falsification: the head of the supposedly Dzhokhar Dudayev looked disproportionately large; he was depicted standing right next to a “Niva” automobile and looking upward at a flying rocket. But a rocket moving at the speed of sound physically could not have been seen in such a way. According to eyewitnesses, at the moment of the strike Dzhokhar Dudayev was located 10–15 meters away from the automobile and was speaking on the telephone with former State Duma deputy of the Russian Federation Konstantin Borovoy (now living in the United States). For the conversation a cable had been specially laid, which also refutes the version of the photograph. All this indicates that the image was fabricated.
Here another detail connected with Borovoy is also important. According to eyewitnesses, on that day Dudayev’s conversation with him was longer than usual, which, as is assumed, allowed the Russian targeting system to detect his location and carry out the strike.
That very same Konstantin Borovoy, Russian politician and entrepreneur, claimed that two years before the events of September 11, 2001, he passed information to the FBI about a possible preparation of a terrorist attack. In the book Russia Against the USA: How I Gave Information to the Director of the FBI About Bin Laden’s Attack on the USA Two Years Before September 11, 2001 (Chicago: Kontinent, 2020, ISBN 9781678033309), he writes that in 1999 he received information about a forthcoming major terrorist attack connected with Osama bin Laden, and passed it on to the American special services.
Official sources, including the report of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 (2004), do not mention Borovoy as a person who provided key information. The Commission recorded that U.S. special services received numerous warnings about possible attacks by “Al-Qaeda,” however, there was no concrete data about the time, place, and method of the attack.
As in the case with Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the information turned out to be insufficient for concrete actions by the FBI. As a result, the FBI and CIA once again appeared in an unfavorable light — as structures that demonstrated incompetence.
Why then did “Kavkaz-Center” release such material 16 years later? At that time, this very resource was one of the main sources of information for Chechen youth. As the media write, Tamerlan Tsarnaev was its constant reader. Thus, the thought was being instilled into his head that not only Russia, but also the USA, were involved in the killing of Dzhokhar Dudayev. And the article about the tribute that the USA stopped paying religiously justified a possible attack. This was a deliberate substitution of focus. Additionally, Tsarnaev could have been persuaded that committing a terrorist act in America would bring greater resonance, become “revenge for all Muslims,” and supposedly bring benefit to the common cause.
This precisely explains why the interrogation of Tamerlan Tsarnaev conducted by the FBI and CIA in 2011 did not reveal a threat in him. His radicalization and actual reprogramming took place already during the trip to Dagestan in 2012.
In April 2013 the FSB passed to the FBI a recording of a conversation between Tamerlan and Zubeidat, presenting it as proof of the warnings of 2011, although it could have been created in 2012 already in Dagestan under FSB control. This manipulation allowed the FSB to accuse the FBI of incompetence and to propose cooperation, strengthening Russia’s positions. In August–September 2013 the terrorist attack strengthened antiwar sentiments in the USA, weakening support for a military strike against Syria after the chemical attack in Ghouta. Russia proposed the liquidation of Syrian chemical weapons, postponing U.S. intervention, which coincided with its geopolitical interests. Counterterrorism cooperation with the USA, initiated after the terrorist attack, positioned Moscow as a partner, despite its alleged role, which reflected the rehabilitation of Russia after tense relations because of the killing of Sergei Magnitsky and the adoption of the “Magnitsky List.”
III. Parallels with the “Sapsan” Case and the Poisoning of Litvinenko
At that very time, when Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his mother were under psychological and religious influence of “Misha the Armenian,” in 2011 the following case occurred.
My experience as a lawyer in the case of the attempted terrorist attack on the “Sapsan” train in 2011 revealed striking similarities with the Boston terrorist attack. A group under the leadership of Islam Khamzhuev from the Danestan group, which according to the FSB included Mansur Edilbiyev (residing in Moscow, the son of Chechen politician and activist Mustafa Edilbiyev, connected with Jewish circles), as well as “a Georgian who accepted Islam” — an analog of the figure of “Misha the Armenian,” was assembled according to the same scenario. Khamzhuev, like Tsarnaev, underwent training in explosives and was recruited in Dagestan through pseudo-jamaats controlled by the FSB.
In my practice and based on observations from life I have often had to see one pattern: in groups there appeared a person, ethnically not a Muslim, but who had accepted Islam and demonstrated extremely religious behavior. The same was observed in the two cases I already spoke about. In both cases such figures then disappeared from the case, but their presence played a key psychological role.
In my view, this is a technique that places ethnic Muslims in a position of psychological guilt. Even a non-Muslim who has accepted Islam may seem more devoted and zealous a defender of Muslim values. Then the ethnic Muslim begins to feel that he is “not radical enough,” “not as devoted” as this person, and feels guilt before him. Moreover, the introduction of an ethnic non-Muslim is convenient from the point of view of control: he does not perceive Islam as a native religion, but acts according to a scenario, playing a role. This reduces the risk of breakdowns in the organization and allows the group to be kept under external management.
Initially, according to Khamzhuev, an attack on a military target was planned. But at the last moment he was ordered to attack a passenger train. He refused, understanding the civilian nature of the target, however, they already had no way of retreat. Two participants were killed, four were convicted under torture. This staging, like the Boston terrorist attack, struck at Chechen-Jewish ties and discredited the Chechen diaspora, its relations with the USA and Israel.
It is important to emphasize that the defendants in the case — neither Fail Nevlyutov, nor Mansur Umaev, nor Mansur Edilbiyev — had awareness of what was happening.
Mansur Edilbiyev, residing in Moscow, similar to Tamerlan Tsarnaev, was not an enemy of either America or Israel: his mother was Jewish. He led an ordinary life, played soccer with peers. The group, however, was organized and drawn into a trap by some “Georgian who accepted Islam,” who appeared in the case materials, but never appeared either in court or in public space.
Thus, all the young people — the very ones who played soccer together, gathered together, attended the mosque — suddenly turned out to be arrested and sentenced to long terms. Confessions from some were beaten out under the cruelest torture, and accusations of radical Islamism were built on an artificially created construction, in which none of them really participated.
This scheme shows methods of work. At that moment Nikolai Patrushev personally reported to President Dmitry Medvedev about the “detention of a terrorist group.” In Russian realities this says that it was precisely he who stands behind this operation.
During the court sessions, in breaks, I spoke with Mustafa Edilbiyev. He was a very educated, intellectual man, a supporter of Dzhokhar Dudayev and the Democratic Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. He emphasized that his son was innocent, which was obvious, and noted that he and his son were being tried to be presented as Islamic radicals, although he raised his son in the spirit of democratic values.
My personal experience in this case, the situation with the Tsarnaev brothers, and what is happening today convince me that all this is links of one chain, links of one scenario and of the same organizers: Nikolai Patrushev and Dmitry Kechkin. The latter today heads the FSB Directorate for the Chechen Republic. Earlier he was deputy head of the FSB Directorate for Dagestan — precisely in 2013, when Tamerlan Tsarnaev was there, and judging from subsequent events one can suppose that it was precisely Kechkin who was the curator of Said Amirov, about whom I wrote above.
After the FBI got onto the trail connected with Dagestan and FBI investigators arrived there. At that very moment Said Amirov was arrested — an FSB agent and simultaneously the mayor of Makhachkala (1998–2013), who, according to many sources, has hundreds, and possibly thousands of murders on his account, including officers of the Dagestani police, committed with the help of his gangs and pseudo-religious groups.
Said Amirov repeatedly became the target of assassination attempts, was considered unsinkable, and was never held accountable. However, after the arrival of American investigators in Dagestan, he was arrested.
On June 1, 2013, Amirov was detained in Makhachkala on suspicion of organizing the murder of Investigative Committee investigator of the Russian Federation Arsen Gadzhibekov (December 2011) and transferred to Moscow.
Amirov’s detention was extremely theatrical and widely covered in the media: allegedly, a special operations group from Moscow, which arrived by helicopter, landed in the yard of his house, after which Amirov was arrested, all of this broadcast on TV. Such a public and demonstrative detention is atypical for persons of his level, but clearly demonstrated to the FBI investigators how the mayor’s arrest took place.
He was held in the FSB pre-trial detention center “Lefortovo,” where on June 11 he allegedly cut his veins and was transferred to City Clinical Hospital No. 20 to receive medical assistance. On August 27, 2015, the North Caucasus District Military Court in Rostov-on-Don sentenced Amirov to life imprisonment for organizing the murder of Gadzhibekov, banditry, and preparing a terrorist attack (including the alleged assassination attempt on the head of the Pension Fund of Dagestan, FSB agent Sagid Murtazaliev).
The arrest and the incident with the “cut veins” allowed the Russian side to isolate Amirov from American investigators. After this, the reassignment of people connected with Amirov began. It was not about punishment for real murders or terrorist acts committed by his subordinates, but about corruption cases, which in Russian realities and in the cases of Amirov himself looked ridiculous and formal, in fact ensuring the redistribution of Amirov’s property to new persons.
The immediate supervisors of these processes were Deputy Head of the FSB of Dagestan Dmitry Kechkin and Ramazan Abdulatipov — the new head of the Republic of Dagestan (2013–2017). In my view, this was a redistribution of property and a kind of payment for the “successful” operation in the USA to Dmitry Kechkin and Ramazan Abdulatipov.
Reference:
In 2013 Dmitry Kechkin held the position of Deputy Head of the Directorate of the FSB for the Republic of Dagestan until his appointment as Head of the Directorate of the FSB for Ingushetia in October 2022. This is confirmed, for example, by his participation in an event in Dagestan in 2021, where he is mentioned as First Deputy Head of the FSB Directorate for Dagestan, Major General.
On November 10, 2023, Dmitry Kechkin was appointed Head of the Directorate of the FSB for the Chechen Republic. This was reported by the Russian Gauleiter of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov in his Telegram channel, noting that Kechkin was presented to him by FSB Lieutenant General Sergey Sapunkov.
Context and meaning:
After the terrorist attack on October 7, 2023 by Hamas terrorists against Israel, media reports began to appear about plans to unite Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Chechnya into a single Muslim enclave. For almost 20 years Russia invested huge sums into the construction of mosques in the temporarily occupied Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and in its provinces Dagestan and Ingushetia, turning these republics into an Islamic ghetto in a “beautiful wrapper.”
It is important to note that Ramzan Kadyrov, whom Russian propaganda presents almost as an independent figure, in reality is the Russian Gauleiter of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI). He is subordinate to the ROSH (Regional Operational Headquarters), which, in addition to the head of the republic, includes all security agencies. This headquarters is always headed by the head of the FSB Directorate of the republic.
An analogous structure operates in the Russian provinces of Dagestan and Ingushetia. The Regional Operational Headquarters of these republics are subordinate to the central Operational Headquarters (OH), the name of which the FSB periodically changes for conspiracy, and which is headed by Nikolai Patrushev, nicknamed among the Chechen people “the Russian Freddy Krueger.”
Based on the available data, it can be asserted that Russia has long been creating an “Islamist ghetto” on the territory of ChRI, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. Within the framework of this policy, since 2024 Palestinian leaders, functionaries, and recruiters together with families and militants are being brought in. For them, a “Putin district” is being organized, where housing is urgently being built for them.
After the USA concluded peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia and took control of the Zangezur corridor for 99 years, Russia on the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dagestan, and Ingushetia is likely planning to create a new “Gaza Strip” in the Caucasus.
Dmitry Kechkin is a co-organizer of the terrorist attack against the USA in Boston in 2013. He consistently occupied leadership positions in three republics: Deputy Head of the FSB in Dagestan, Head of the FSB Directorate in Ingushetia, now — Head of the FSB Directorate in ChRI. In this regard, there are grounds to consider him a key figure and a proven enemy of the USA, capable of continuing terrorist activities against America’s allies and US interests in the South Caucasus.
The similarity in methods of discrediting Western special services between the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 in London and the discrediting of Ruslan Tsarni and Mustafa Edelbiev is obvious. Litvinenko, a former FSB officer who exposed Russian special services operations on the apartment bombings in 1999, was killed using polonium-210. This murder undermined the reputation of the British special services MI5 and MI6, in the same way as the Boston terrorist attack of 2013 cast doubt on the competence of the CIA and the FBI.
Another interesting coincidence: the executors of the murder of Litvinenko are considered to be Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitry Kovtun. It is known that Kovtun’s ex-wife and mother-in-law, psychologist from the USSR Eleonora Vall, reside in Hamburg. Traces of polonium-210 were found in her home, since Kovtun stayed there before the attack on Litvinenko. Eleonora Vall, being a psychologist, provides assistance to many Chechens in Germany, including in obtaining refugee status.
An analogous situation, similar to the case of the Tsarnaev family, is unfolding in relation to me and my family (this is a separate and large topic), in connection with which I filed a statement with the law enforcement authorities of Germany.
The phrase of Henry Kissinger “To be America’s enemy is dangerous, but to be its friend is fatal,” spoken in 1968, reflected the unreliability of the USA as an ally using the example of South Vietnam. In a conversation with William Buckley, Kissinger discussed the risk of eliminating President Nguyen Van Thieu, pointing to the fate of Ngo Dinh Diem, overthrown and killed in 1963 with the connivance of the USA. He warned that new connivance would undermine trust in America, making alliance with it dangerous.
Russian propaganda actively uses this phrase, torn out of context and distorted, in order to instill the idea that cooperation with the West is fraught with risks, strengthening distrust of Western special structures. In the context of this statement, as well as the cases of Litvinenko, Tsarni, Edelbiev, and my own case, this acquires special meaning.
Aslan Artsuev, Chairman of Human Rights Center Ichkeria.
October 21, 2025
Translated with the help of AI.*